Yet another example of very  bad and very expensive decisions by the nuclear industry and a blinkered nuclear-supporting Government.

This devastating report merits wide circulation. Yet another example of very  bad and very expensive decisions by the nuclear industry and a blinkered nuclear-supporting Government. When, oh when ,will they ever learn?!!! And listen for once to the much better informed and insightful critics……


21st Report – The Nuclear Decommissioning Authority’s Magnox contract | PDF version 21st Report – The Nuclear Decommissioning Authority’s Magnox contract ( PDF )House of Commons | Public Accounts | HC 461 | Published 28 February 2018

The Nuclear Decommissioning Authority’s Magnox contract


Terms of Reference



Conclusions and recommendations

1 Failed procurement and contract management

The NDA’s procurement failure

Failures in contract management

2 Capability and governance

The Nuclear Decommissioning Authority’s capability

Government oversight

Learning the lessons

Formal minutes


Published correspondence

List of Reports from the Committee during the current session


The Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) completely failed in both the procurement and management of the contract to clean up the Magnox nuclear reactor sites—one of the highest value and most important contracts let by Government. Not only did this disrupt an important component of vital nuclear decommissioning work, but it also cost the taxpayer upwards of £122 million.

The NDA ran an overly complex procurement process, resulting in it awarding the contract to the wrong bidder, and subsequently settling legal claims from a losing consortium to the tune of nearly £100 million. The NDA also drastically under-estimated the scale of the work needed to decommission the sites at the time it let the contract—another failure which ultimately led to the termination of the Magnox contract 9 years early. The NDA will now have to spend even more effort and money to find a suitable way of managing these sites after the contract comes to an official end in September 2019. If it is to be trusted with letting future contracts to clean up nuclear sites, it must have a proper understanding of the state of the sites before committing taxpayer’s money to a contract, and then it must also monitor progress closely.

These failures have caused untold reputational damage to the NDA and raise serious questions about its credibility as a strategic contracting authority. But central government must also share the blame. Not only did HM Treasury and the Department approve the NDA’s approaches to procurement and contract management, but there are clear failings in the Department’s subsequent challenge and oversight of the NDA, through UK Government Investments.

Government ‘culpable’ in nuclear clean up bungle

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